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Renewing the Budget: Recommendations for 
Louisiana’s Renewable Energy Tax Credit 
INTRODUCTION 
In 2007, Louisiana legislators enacted the Wind and Solar 
Energy Systems Tax Credit (WSES), a Louisiana tax credit that 
encourages increased investment and usage of renewable energy 
technologies, including both solar and wind power.1 Over the past 
five years, actual costs of the tax credit have exceeded budget 
projections by more than 18 times.2 The 2012 Louisiana Tax 
Exemption Budget states that the purpose of the wind and solar tax 
exemption will be achieved if operated “in a fiscally effective 
manner.”3 Critics say that the inflated costs of the tax credit are in 
no way fiscally effective.4 On the other hand, proponents believe 
that higher costs from the tax credit represent more consumers 
taking advantage of the subsidy, which creates a positive effect on 
Louisiana’s economy.5  
The underlying purpose of Louisiana’s renewable energy tax 
policy needs to be reexamined. Due to vague drafting of the tax 
credit and a misguided approach, the WSES is wreaking havoc on 
the Louisiana state budget. A novel assessment of the policy’s goals 
is necessary to properly recommend a course of action to the 
Louisiana Legislature in their future attempt to amend the tax 
credit.6 This includes examining sources of energy on which to use 
tax policy, the negative effects of tax policy in general, and how to 
manage externalities from non-renewable energy sources. When tax 
policy extends into the energy sector, many considerations arise. 
Such considerations include the length of time that the subsidy 
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 1. Act No. 371, 2007 La. Acts 2076, 2077 (codified at LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 47:6030 (2009)). 
 2. Melinda Deslatte, La. Solar Tax Credit Price Tag Far Above Estimates, 
BUS. WK. (Aug. 9, 2012), http://www.businessweek.com/ap/2012-08-09/la-dot-
solar-tax-credit-price-tag-far-above-estimates. 
 3. LA. DEP’T OF REVENUE, TAX EXEMPTION BUDGET 2011−2012, at 123 
(2011–2012), http://www.revenue.louisiana.gov/forms/publications/TEB%282011 
%29.pdf. 
 4. See Michelle Millhollon, Official: Solar Energy Tax Credit Needs Limits, 
THE ADVOCATE (Oct. 23, 2012), http://theadvocate.com/news/4213973-123 
/official-solar-energy-tax-credit. 
 5. See id. 
 6. Maria Koklanaris, Louisiana Lawmakers Approve Phaseout of Solar 
Panel Tax Credit, 2013 STT 108−18. The Louisiana State Senate approved 
legislation to sunset the WSES by January 1, 2017. 
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should remain in effect, how to encourage energy producers to be 
self-sufficient, and how to manage demand of energy.  
To recommend a fresh course of action to the Louisiana 
Legislature, this Comment will first discuss the pitfalls of 
subsidizing renewable energy sources and will analyze many 
alternatives to tax policy that encourage the use of renewable energy 
sources. These alternatives include renewable portfolio standards, 
feed-in tariffs, and research grants and loans as tools to incentivize 
renewable energy use. Additionally, cap-and-trade programs and 
carbon taxes indirectly incentivize renewable energies by imposing 
restrictions and costs on non-renewable activities. Each of these 
alternatives is currently utilized internationally or within the United 
States. Some alternatives are even present in Louisiana. 
Part I of this Comment will explain the current goals of 
legislators who shape federal renewable energy policy. Part II 
explains the reasons for using tax policies to promote renewable 
energy use and explores the negative consequences of using tax 
policy to achieve these goals. Part II also considers the petroleum 
industry as a tax policy case study to draw important lessons for 
how renewable energy tax policy should be structured. Part III 
examines alternatives to using tax subsidies to encourage the use of 
renewable energy sources. Part IV introduces the issues with 
Louisiana’s wind and solar energy systems tax credit and analyzes 
the effectiveness of wind and solar energy compared to other energy 
sources. Finally, Part V presents an alternative federal policy to 
encourage renewable energy production, considers proposed 
amendments to the Louisiana tax credit, and recommends a new 
course of action for Louisiana’s renewable energy system tax credit. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. The Importance of Renewable Energy 
Renewable energy sources have been a recent topic of debate 
since the goal of United States energy independence is gaining 
prominence.7 One current debate centers on whether the United 
States should attain energy independence through supporting 
increased oil and gas drilling and providing tax cuts for domestic oil 
production8 or through minimizing the country’s oil dependence by 
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expanding support for clean energy sources (wind, solar, biomass, 
hydropower, clean coal, natural gas, and nuclear power).9 
Climate change is another global concern that is driving the 
development of renewable energy sources.10 The opinion of a large 
scientific community is that greenhouse gases affect the world’s 
climate, disrupt agriculture and nations’ economies, and cause 
migration effects.11 Experts advocate a transformation of energy 
production, consumption habits, and transportation methods in order 
to combat the consequences of climate change.12 
Regardless of which policy is followed, the United States has 
long maintained a large stake in the advancement of alternative 
energy sources. In a 1990 report, the General Accounting Office 
stated that “developing alternative fuels, increasing fuel efficiency in 
transportation, and continuing development of the Strategic 
Petroleum Reserve” would be more beneficial than additional oil 
and gas subsidies towards the goal of increasing energy security.13 
The United States Department of Energy’s mission for renewable 
energy today is to “[c]atalyze the timely, material, and efficient 
transformation of the nation’s energy system and secure U.S. 
leadership in clean energy technologies.”14 
In order to encourage the development of alternative energy 
technology,15 Congress has instituted many federal tax credits.16 
Most states also offer tax incentives and other policies to encourage 
                                                                                                             
 
(2012), http://energycommerce.house.gov/sites/republicans.energy-commerce.house 
.gov/files/Hearings/EP/20120913/HHRG-112-IF03-WState-Weiss D-20120913.pdf 
(statement of Daniel J. Weiss, Senior Fellow, Ctr. For Am. Progress Action Fund). 
 9. See THE WHITE HOUSE, BLUEPRINT FOR A SECURE ENERGY FUTURE (2011), 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/blueprint_secure_energy_future.pdf.  
 10. See Angela Merkel, Foreword to GLOBAL SUSTAINABILITY, at ix (Hans 
Joachim Schellnhuber et al, eds., 2010) (“Climate change threatens both our 
security and economic development.”). 
 11. ERIC A. POSNER & DAVID WEISBACH, CLIMATE CHANGE JUSTICE 1 
(2010). 
 12. Merkel, supra note 10, at ix. 
 13. U. S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/GGD-90-75, TAX POLICY: 
ADDITIONAL PETROLEUM PRODUCTION TAX INCENTIVES ARE OF QUESTIONABLE 
MERIT 4 (1990), http://www.gao.gov/assets/150/149358.pdf. 
 14. Mission, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, http://energy.gov/mission (last visited 
Oct. 1, 2013). 
 15. See generally Mona Hymel, The United States’ Experience with Energy-
Based Tax Incentives: The Evidence Supporting Tax Incentives for Renewable 
Energy, 38 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 43 (2006). 
 16. See id. at 64–78 (providing examples of federal tax credits). 
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the development of renewable energy sources that work in 
conjunction with the federal credits.17 
II. ECONOMIC BASIS FOR TAX CREDITS AND HISTORICAL EXAMPLES 
IN THE ENERGY SECTOR 
A. The Case for Tax Policy 
In order to properly analyze the effectiveness of Louisiana’s tax 
credits, it is important to understand how and why legislators use tax 
policy to encourage certain activities. Tax theory aims to discover 
how to most efficiently allocate resources without the negative 
effects that taxes can cause. One such negative effect is market 
distortion.18 Market efficiency can be measured by a number of 
methods. Tax theorists assume that a perfectly efficient market 
generates an ideal allocation of resources.19 This ideal allocation of 
resources is referred to as the Pareto efficiency.20 A Pareto efficient 
market is one where no single participant can increase his own 
benefits without producing negative effects for another party.21 The 
Kaldor-Hicks standard is another method of measuring efficiency, 
but it adopts a macro-economic view rather than the micro-
economic view of the Pareto method. According to the Kaldor-
Hicks method, efficiency is achieved when the market participant’s 
change in activity benefits society at large, even though some may 
be negatively affected.22 However, these measures of efficiency 
sometimes fall short. Perfectly efficient markets rarely exist because 
of externalities. Externalities are positive or negative side effects 
that result from market activity and distort the true costs or benefits 
derived from the activity.23 
In the energy industry, the most prevalent examples of 
externalities are pollutants. Without market regulation, non-clean 
energy companies only pay for their own activities (the labor, 
materials, and indirect costs) while the community bears the social 
                                                                                                             
 17. See Database of State Incentives for Renewables & Efficiency, U. S. 
DEP’T OF ENERGY, http://www.dsireusa.org/ (last visited Oct. 1, 2013). 
 18. See Eric M. Zolt, The Uneasy Case for Uniform Taxation, 16 VA. TAX 
REV. 39, 69 (1996). 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. at 61. 
 21. Id. 
 22. See Nicholas Kaldor, Welfare Propositions of Economics and 
Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility, 49 ECON. J. 549 (1939). 
 23. Zolt, supra note 18, at 69. 
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and environmental costs of the resulting pollution.24 Thus, the 
market is inefficient because the energy producers are not paying the 
socially efficient price.25 For this reason, governments tend to step 
in and implement either regulation or tax policy. English economist, 
Arthur Pigou, was the first to suggest the theory of using tax policy 
to manage externalities.26 The Coase theorem suggests an alternative 
to tax policy with a private market solution to the problem of 
negative externalities.27 The Coase theorem accepts that market 
failures exist, so Coase suggests that if a party causes a negative 
externality on another party who is aware of the cost, without 
transaction costs, the parties could come to an efficient solution.28 
Tax policy in the energy sector consists of either taxes or 
subsidies to accomplish social, economic, environmental, or 
financial goals by influencing the market.29 Taxes are used to 
discourage a certain activity through monetary means; however, 
subsidies, such as tax credits, are incentives.30 In the energy sector, 
tax credits are mainly used to encourage the growth of technology 
development.31 The key to finding the most effective use of tax 
credits is to support subsidies in industries where the initial capital 
outlay presents the largest barrier of entry into the market.32 
B. The Negative Effects of Using Tax Policy 
While taxes can be useful to disincentivize less desirable 
activities, the most efficient tax is one that causes the lowest amount 
of market distortions.33 There are three effects that distortions cause: 
(1) the income effect, (2) the substitution effect, and (3) the financial 
effect.34 
The income effect, which is created by the imposition of taxes, 
is measured by the changes in consumer behavior to make up for 
                                                                                                             
 24. See DAVID HUNTER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND 
POLICY 105–07 (Thomson Reuters/Foundation Press, 4th ed. 2011). 
 25. Id. at 69–70. 
 26. See A.C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 192–93 (4th ed. 1960). 
 27. See R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).  
 28. See id. 
 29. SALVATORE LAZZARI, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33578, ENERGY TAX 
POLICY: HISTORY AND CURRENT ISSUES 1 (2008), http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs 
/misc/RL33578.pdf.  
 30. Id. 
 31. See generally id. 
 32. Hymel, supra note 15, at 45.  
 33. Zolt, supra note 18, at 63. 
 34. Id. 
122 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. 2 
 
 
 
lost purchasing power.35 An example of an income effect is a 
consumer working extra hours to supplement income spent to pay 
for energy cost increases. 
The substitution effect occurs when consumers choose lower-
taxed activities or goods instead of similar, higher-taxed activities or 
goods.36 For example, if one could hypothetically purchase natural 
gas and petroleum energy at the same price and a tax on petroleum 
was imposed, a rational consumer would purchase natural gas over 
petroleum.  
Finally, the financial effect occurs when individuals or 
corporations change their procedures in order to manipulate the tax 
treatment of their activities.37 Energy companies hiring tax 
consultants to provide the most favorable tax treatment is a financial 
effect. 
Policy-makers aim to minimize market distortion in order to 
lessen these effects of tax policy that result in a deadweight loss in 
the market.38 A deadweight loss is the difference between the free 
market level of supply and demand and the inefficiencies caused by 
the income effect, substitution effect, and the financial effect. The 
amount of deadweight loss is influenced by the price elasticity of the 
activity being taxed.39 Price elasticity is the sensitivity of demand to 
changes in price;40 greater price elasticity leads to more sensitivity 
to demand. If a good is more sensitive to demand, the tax policy will 
cause more distortion due to the influences on consumer behavior.41 
Demand is elastic if the price elasticity index is greater than ±1.42 
                                                                                                             
 35. Id. The income effect is most commonly observed through two scenarios: 
(1) when taxes are imposed on a good, which is passed on to the consumer, and 
(2) when taxes are imposed on the consumer. In the first scenario, a person with 
unchanged income has less purchasing power to acquire the good. In the second 
scenario, however, the consumer has less purchasing power when the prices 
remain constant. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. Since the goal is finding a tax that minimizes distortions in consumer 
behavior, a lump sum tax is often discussed. A lump sum tax is fixed and cannot 
be changed based on consumer behavior. However, lump-sum taxes are often 
rejected because of problems with equity. Persons with lower income take on the 
same burden as those with higher income. Id. at 64. 
 39. Id. 
 40. JOHN C.B. COOPER, ORG. OF THE PETROLEUM EXPORTING COS., PRICE 
ELASTICITY OF DEMAND FOR CRUDE OIL: ESTIMATES FOR 23 COUNTRIES 3 (2003), 
http://15961.pbworks.com/f/Cooper.2003.OPECReview.PriceElasticityofDemandf
orCrudeOil.pdf.  
 41. Zolt, supra note 18, at 63. 
 42. Economics Basics: Elasticity, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia 
.com/university/economics/economics4.asp#axzz2BOllExaX (last visited Oct. 1, 
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Likewise, demand is inelastic if the index of the good is less than 
±1.43 For example, the price elasticity index for crude oil in the 
United States is –0.061.44 This means that crude oil is a very 
inelastic energy source,45 and deadweight loss would be minimal if 
tax policies manipulate oil prices. The price elasticity index acts as a 
multiplier to the market distortions and worsens the situation as the 
elasticity of the product increases. In other words, consumers will 
generally continue to buy petroleum products at the same level if a 
tax is imposed on the product. In comparison, one limited study 
placed the price elasticity for renewable energy sources at 
approximately +2.7, which means tax legislators would be more 
hesitant to subsidize the renewable energy sector.46 
B. Use of Tax Subsidies in the Oil Industry 
Historical examples of tax policy in the energy industry are 
important because they illustrate potential problems with future 
policies. Such problems include when to end tax subsidies,47 
whether to extend the duration of tax subsidies until the industry 
achieves financial independence, and whether the burdens on both 
federal and state income are ultimately worth it. It is therefore 
appropriate to examine the oil industry’s rise to the United States’ 
primary energy source and the role that tax policy played in that rise. 
There were three primary reasons for the tax subsidies provided to 
the oil industry: (1) to encourage petrochemical exploration for 
reserves during the initial research and development stages of oil 
                                                                                                             
 
2013). The more that the elasticity indexes exceeds ±1, the more elastic the item is. 
Items with high elasticity are often luxuries or have substitutes. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. COOPER, supra note 40, at 4. 
 45. Oil is very inelastic because it is a necessary commodity. The number of 
substitutes is very limited. The long-run price elasticity of crude oil increases to -
0.453. The long-run index uses demand numbers that assume more substitutes will 
become available over time. 
 46. Erik Johnson, The Price Elasticity of Supply of Renewable Electricity 
Generation: Evidence from State Renewable Portfolio Standards 2 (Ga. Inst. of 
Tech., Working Paper No. WP2011-001, 2011), https://smartech.gatech.edu 
/bitstream/handle/1853/44246/WP2011-001EJohnson.pdf?sequence=1. 
 47. Nick Juliano, Tax Policy: Building a Bridge to Zero -- Questions Swirl 
Around Design of Wind Incentive Phaseout, E&E PUBLISHING, LLC (June 12, 
2012), http://www.eenews.net/public/EEDaily/2012/06/12/2 (“Determining a 
definite endpoint for the [production tax credit] is difficult because a number of 
variables are at play -- primarily the price of [competing sources], as well as the 
pace of advancements in . . . technology, the cost of credit for . . . developers and 
the broader, economywide demand for energy.”). 
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production, (2) to mitigate dangers that arise during the production 
cycle, and (3) to bridge the gap between the activity costs in the 
private and public sectors.48 
The oil industry began when petroleum was discovered to be the 
optimal alternative to coal.49 Incentives to boost the amount of 
reserves and production levels began in 1916 with the expensing50 
of intangible drilling costs51 (IDCs).52 Deductible IDCs included 
labor costs, material costs, overhead, and repairs as expense write-
offs.53 In 1926, Congress implemented the percentage depletion 
allowance, which allows taxpayers to recuperate a percentage of the 
costs of mineral investment.54 Under the percentage depletion 
allowance, the extraction of oil deposits from a landowner’s 
property is recognized as an expense. The purchase price of the land, 
exploration costs, and investments are recognized as capital costs, 
which means that the corresponding costs can be deducted in future 
tax years.55 The annual allowed recovery for extraction is based on a 
fixed percentage of nationwide production, so the recoverable 
amount can exceed actual investment by the taxpayer.56 
In the 1970s, the United States began to deplete its proven oil 
reserves while consumer demand continued to increase.57 In 
response, Congress passed two major pieces of legislation to 
encourage development of unproven oil resources.58 First, the Crude 
Oil Windfall Profit Act of 1980 provided a $3.00 tax credit per 
barrel of oil produced in the United States.59 Second, the Energy 
Policy Act of 2005 provided many incentives for the oil and gas 
industry, as well as the renewable energy industry. The 2005 act 
                                                                                                             
 48. Hymel, supra note 15, at 47. 
 49. Id. 
 50. For accounting treatment, expensing is the deduction of expenses in the 
current year rather than capitalizing, which allows deductions over the useful life 
of an asset. 
 51. Intangible drilling costs are expenditures that have no salvage value. 
 52. LAZZARI, supra note 29, at 2. 
 53. T.D. 2447, 19 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 31 (1917). Expensing refers to the 
ability to deduct losses from profits in order to lower the amount of taxable 
income. This way, oil producers could fully deduct the costs of bringing a well 
into production from income. 
 54. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PETROLEUM AND ETHANOL FUELS: 
TAX INCENTIVES AND RELATED GAO WORK 5 (2000), http://www.gao.gov/new 
.items/rc00301r.pdf. 
 55. See Hymel, supra note 15, at 48. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. at 47, 49. 
 58. See id. at 50–54. Unproven sources include shale oil, tar sand oil, 
biomass, liquid and gaseous coal. 
 59. Crude Oil Windfall Profits Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-223, 94 Stat. 229 
(1980) (current version at 26 U.S.C. 45K (2006)). 
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broadens provisions that allow more taxpayers to qualify for the 
percentage depletion allowance and increases the maximum amount 
of barrels that can utilize the allowance.60 The effect of the 2005 Act 
is a tax cut of $18.8 billion across the energy industry.61 According to 
a 2005 Congressional Budget Office report, the petroleum and natural 
gas industry have the lowest capital effective tax rate (9.2%) among 
corporations.62 Given the United States’ continued dependence on 
petroleum,63 the severely low effective tax rates on the oil industry, 
and the recent failed attempts of incentivizing further oil production,64 
a change in petroleum industry tax policy is necessary. 
III. COMPARISON OF LOUISIANA’S TAX CREDITS TO OTHER 
APPROACHES 
There are several alternatives to Louisiana’s renewable energy 
tax credit that would encourage renewable energy use and 
development of renewable energy technology. These alternatives 
involve regulatory intervention or adaptations of tax policy. Some 
policies incentivize the desired activity, while others only manage 
externalities by imposing restrictions on less desirable activities. 
A. Incentives for Renewable Energy Markets 
1. Renewable Portfolio Standards 
Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPS) are state-level policies 
that require utility companies to allocate a set rate of renewable-
                                                                                                             
 60. Joint Committee on Taxation, Description and Technical Explanation of 
the Conference Agreement of H.R. 6, Title XIII, the “Energy Tax Incentives Act of 
2005” (JCX-60-05), July 28, 2005, http://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func 
=startdown&id=1555. 
 61. LAZZARI, supra note 29, at 11. 
 62. PAUL BURNHAM & LARRY OZANNE, CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, 
TAXING CAPITAL INCOME: EFFECTIVE RATES AND APPROACHES TO REFORM 11 
(2005), http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/67xx/doc6792/10-
18-tax.pdf. 
 63. See U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., DOE/EIA-0383(2012), ANNUAL ENERGY 
OUTLOOK 2012 WITH PROJECTIONS TO 2035, at 131 (2012), http://www.eia.gov 
/forecases/aeo/pdf/0383(2012).pdf (noting that projected U.S. consumption of oil 
and other petroleum sources through 2035 have a projected growth rate of 0.0%). 
 64. See U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., SR/OIAF/2004-01, ANALYSIS OF FIVE 
SELECTED TAX PROVISIONS OF THE CONFERENCE ENERGY BILL OF 2003, at 2 
(2004), http://www.eia.gov/analysis/requests/archive/2004/ceb/pdf/sroiaf%282004 
%2901.pdf (“With the exception of Section 29, the provisions considered in this 
report do not measurably increase domestic oil or gas production over the next 10 
years or over the forecast through 2025.”). 
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sourced electricity to consumers.65 The purpose of RPS policy is to 
increase the market demand of renewable energy sources.66 The hope 
behind this purpose is that renewable energy sources will become 
competitive alternatives due to cost reductions from economies of 
scale.67 Utility companies can comply with RPS mandates in three 
ways: (1) acquiring a renewable energy generation unit, (2) 
purchasing bundled renewable electricity from a renewable facility, or 
(3) purchasing renewable energy certificates.68 A renewable energy 
credit is a tradable commodity that represents one megawatt hour 
(MWh) of electricity produced from a renewable generator.69 
Renewable energy producers may redeem certificates issued by the 
state’s RPS and sell these certificates to utility companies who are 
mandated to meet RPS standards. The certificates represent 
compliance with state mandates and theoretically shift the 
environmental damage payments to the energy producers. 
Renewable certificate transactions between renewable energy 
producers and the utility companies illustrate application of the 
Coase theorem.70 According to the theorem, if the cost to 
compensate the harmed party is less than the costs required to 
prevent the harm, the party causing the harm would rather reach a 
bargain with the affected parties than pay the price of prevention.71 
The compensatory payments become factored into the activity’s cost 
of production when the “winner” pays the harmed party.72 In 
applying this illustration to RPS, the system assumes that it is more 
cost effective for the utilities to purchase certificates than to prevent 
the harm by completely eliminating non-clean energy sources or 
creating renewable sources. 
Louisiana is currently exploring the implementation of RPS.73 In 
2010, the Louisiana Public Service Commission (LPSC) approved a 
                                                                                                             
 65. Renewable Portfolio Standards, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 
http://www.epa.gov/agstar/tools/funding/renewable.html (last updated Sept. 27, 
2012). 
 66. Id. 
 67. OLE LANGNISS & RYAN WISER, ERNEST ORLANDO LAWRENCE BERKELEY 
NATIONAL LABORATORY, THE RENEWABLES PORTFOLIO STANDARD IN TEXAS 14 
(2001), http://eande.lbl.gov/sites/all/files/publications/report-lbnl-49107.pdf; see 
also Alan McDonald & Leo Schrattenholzer, Learning Rates for Energy 
Technologies, 29 ENERGY POL’Y 255, 255 (2001) (noting that economies of scale 
occur when unit costs decrease with increased experience and expertise). 
 68. Renewable Portfolio Standards, supra note 65. 
 69. Id. 
 70. See Coase, supra note 27. 
 71. See generally id. 
 72. Id. at 11. 
 73. See Re-study of a Renewable Portfolio Standard for the State of 
Louisiana, Docket No. R-28271 Subdocket B (La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n August 21, 
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RPS pilot program.74 The program remains in the experimental 
stage of implementation to verify that utility costs do not 
significantly increase from companies passing on the costs to 
customers.75 The pilot program contains two major components: the 
research component and the Request for Proposal (RFP) 
component.76 The research component requires investor-owned 
utility companies to develop at least three projects that provide data 
about renewable energy resources.77 Companies either may 
construct their own renewable energy generators or must create a 
pricing arrangement with renewable energy producers to purchase 
energy; these projects must be in full operation by the end of 2013.78 
The RFP component applies to all utilities in Louisiana and requires 
each company to submit proposals for development of long-term 
(ten to twenty years) renewable energy resources.79 However, the 
Re-Study docket does not specify location requirements for either 
the research or the RFP projects.80 Therefore, the utilities could 
potentially farm their renewable production outside of Louisiana 
while the non-renewable activity continues at the same level within 
the state. 
2. Feed-in Tariffs 
Feed-in tariffs are fast growing market incentives that were first 
implemented in Europe twenty years ago.81 Feed-in tariffs mandate 
that utility companies enter into long-term (10–20 year) supply 
contracts with renewable energy producers at fixed rates.82 The rates 
are often set at the renewable energy producer’s cost of production 
or, in some cases, a premium is added to the market price of 
electricity.83 Generally, the rates are differentiated between types of 
                                                                                                             
 
2013), available at http://lpscstar.louisiana.gov/star/ViewFile.aspx?Id=e81d68d0-
0101-4c38-8b8a-8e2f0814d321. 
 74. Re-study of a Renewable Portfolio Standard for the State of Louisiana, 
Docket No. R-28271 Subdocket B (La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n June 23, 2010), 
available at http://lpscstar.louisiana.gov/star/ViewFile.aspx?Id=d1389c71-c14f-
46e1-8fa9-4d429cc0431b. 
 75. Id. at 4. 
 76. Id. at 3–5. 
 77. Id. at 4. 
 78. Id. at 5. 
 79. Id. 
 80. See id. 
 81. Wilson H. Rickerson, et. al., If the Shoe FITs: Using Feed-in Tariffs to 
Meet U.S. Renewable Electricity Targets, 20 ELECTRICITY J. 73, 73 (2007). 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
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renewable energy to allow the producer to recover the initial 
investment of production and to possibly increase capacity.84 In 
addition to incentivizing the production of renewable energy, a 
major benefit of feed-in tariffs is the reduced strain on the power 
grid.85 
In Europe, the predecessor to feed-in tariffs began in 1991 with 
the Stromeinspeisungsgesetz (Electricity Feed Act), which 
established the price for German utilities purchasing renewable 
energy at 90% of the market electricity rate.86 This market-guided 
approach ultimately failed when German energy prices decreased 
below a profitable level for renewable producers. Germany 
subsequently enacted the Erneuerbare-Energien-Gesetz (EEG or 
Renewable Energy Act), which fixed prices by an independent 
index.87 The EEG provided fixed price contracts for twenty years, 
with rates decreasing per year to adjust for economies of scale.88 
The initiative has, to date, been rather successful, as Germany has 
increased its renewable energy production from 6.3% of national 
energy consumption in 200089 to 20.8% in 2011.90 With the support 
provided by EEG incentives for renewable generators, Germany has 
developed the greatest capacity of solar energy production in the 
world.91 Denmark and Spain followed Germany’s example by 
introducing similar incentives through feed-in tariffs. These three 
nations now supply 53% of the world’s wind production.92  
In 2001, a debate between proponents of feed-in tariffs and 
proponents of renewable portfolio standards occurred in the 
European Union when the European Parliament Directive 
recommended renewable energy goals for each member nation but 
did not specify how the goals should be attained.93 Poland, the 
United Kingdom, Sweden, Italy, and Romania chose renewable 
portfolio standards; the remaining countries in the European Union 
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decided to implement feed-in tariffs.94 The main difference between 
feed-in tariffs and renewable portfolio standards is that renewable 
portfolio standards use quantity-based regulation in the energy 
market while feed-in tariffs are a price-based regulation.95 In other 
words, quantity-based policies control the amount of energy 
production allowed in the market. Alternatively, rice-based 
mechanisms focus solely on manipulating the price of an energy 
source. In order to study the effectiveness of these two energy 
strategies, the European Commission created a report in 2005.96 
Most countries aiming to improve renewable energy portfolio 
performance adopted a feed-in tariff system:97 the fact that most 
countries moved to feed-in tariffs indicates that feed-in tariffs are 
more effective at encouraging renewable energy production than 
renewable portfolio standards in the wind and biomass industries. 
Additionally, the study found that price stability from the long-term 
contracts led to increased consumer confidence compared to the 
portfolio standards that were not as insulated from price risks.98 
While renewable portfolio standards and feed-in tariffs are 
viewed as separate policies in Europe, several states in the U.S. 
weave the two policies into one comprehensive program.99 Major 
elements of feed-in tariffs are included in the previously mentioned 
Louisiana Public Service Commission general order to re-evaluate 
renewable portfolio standards.100 Also, tariff options are available in 
the research component of the Louisiana pilot program for 
renewable energies.101 The tariff pricing agreements have pricing 
terms of three years and should be fully operational by the end of 
2013.102 The pricing structure is the value of the utility’s avoided 
cost of purchasing renewable energy rather than producing it, plus a 
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$30 per MWh premium.103 As mentioned above, the main benefit of 
feed-in tariff policy is long-term price stability and consumer 
confidence; the benefits are negated when the policy provides for 
short-term contracts instead.104 The Louisiana renewable energy 
pilot program may not produce accurate results, however, because 
new producers of renewable energy will be less inclined to enter the 
market without a long-term financing commitment. 
3. Research and Development Support 
Research grants, loans, and subsidies are incentives for 
renewable energy production provided at the federal or state level. 
In Europe, these incentives have mostly been replaced by feed-in 
tariff and renewable portfolio standards.105 Under the American 
Reinvestment and Recovery Act of 2009,106 renewable energy 
ventures are eligible for a 30% cash grant in lieu of the federal 
investment tax credit107 or production tax credit.108 Also available 
for renewable energy producers is the Section 1603 grant 
program.109 The program is more valuable than the investment tax 
credit when taxpayers do not have sufficient tax liability110 and “has 
been heavily used by the wind and geothermal energy sectors: as of 
March 1, 2010, 64% of all 2009 large wind power capacity . . . had 
elected . . . the grant rather than the PTC (production tax credit).”111  
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There are a couple criticisms of research grants. These criticisms 
include free riding and utility companies that focus on targeting 
investment rather than results of the research.112 A grant-targeting 
investment (rather than results-targeting) is the main disadvantage of 
grants when compared to production tax credits. While a well-
designed production tax credit will offer a higher tax credit for more 
effective research, a research grant provides fixed amounts. 
Although research grants do not discourage researchers from 
striving for more effective results, they also do not directly 
encourage this effort like production tax credits do.113 The benefits 
derived from research grants could also flow to foreign nations 
through free riding. In this free riding problem, a state or federal 
grant program would pay researchers to invest in renewable energy 
technology and foreign research communities could benefit from the 
domestic investment without bearing the research costs.114 
B. Disincentives for Non-Renewable Sources  
1. Cap-and-Trade 
Cap-and-trade is the practice of creating maximum emissions 
levels in an industry with undesirable impacts, issuing allowances 
within the industry, and providing a trade market for the allowances 
to be transferred.115 In essence, the government creates a system 
where industries must pay to pollute.116 Experts argue that cap-and-
trade programs are better environmental policies than taxes for two 
reasons. First, the maximum emissions level creates a cap on the 
amount of pollution while taxes can only reduce pollution by using 
price controls to discourage emissions.117 Second, cap-and-trade 
mechanisms are more effective at distributing the non-compliance 
consequences because a government chooses how to distribute the 
permits that non-renewable producers must buy.118 The cap-and-
trade method is another example of managing the problem 
introduced by the Coase theorem. The costs of preventing carbon 
emissions are greater than the costs of compensating the harmed 
parties that arise out of cap-and-trade programs.119 Thus, the carbon 
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emissions are negative externalities on the market that distort the 
efficient level of non-clean energy production. The purpose of the 
cap allowances is to impose the cost of societal damage from the 
carbon emissions onto the producers of those emissions so the 
parties will negotiate an efficient solution.  
The U.S. Acid Rain Program120 is a prominent example of a cap-
and-trade program in the United States that creates a ceiling on the 
amount of sulfur dioxide that energy plants can emit.121 At the state 
level, the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative is a mandatory joint 
program among nine East Coast states that plan to reduce carbon 
dioxide emissions.122 The initiative states auction off the allowances 
to utility companies and invest the proceeds into renewable energy 
technologies.123 
Another state cap-and-trade program is California’s AB-32, 
Global Warming Solutions Act, which has a 2020 deadline for 
achieving the greenhouse gas emissions cap.124 AB-32 has a 
significant enforcement structure and serves as a model for a federal 
cap-and-trade program. The enforcement structure includes 
oversight of the certificate auction process to protect against price 
manipulation.125 The California Air Resources Board will also host 
a centralized tracking system of the carbon allowances.126 The 
oversight of the auction process will be provided by an independent 
monitoring organization.127 
2. Carbon Tax 
The goal of carbon taxes is to manage the externalities of carbon 
emissions, which are mainly environmental effects, while providing a 
low amount of administrative costs from collections and oversight.128 
An effective carbon tax rate, according to Pigovian theory, is one 
that is equal to the marginal public damages of producing an 
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additional unit of greenhouse gas.129 Because carbon emissions are 
such a large externality of energy production, a Pigovian tax 
supports free trade by correcting the production to the true price 
where externalities are internalized.130 Finland was the first country 
to introduce a carbon tax in 1990.131 
Australia is in the process of implementing a $23 per ton carbon 
tax on about 300 of Australia’s largest producers of carbon 
emissions from the past year.132 An interesting aspect of the 
Australian carbon tax, and one that will surely increase the chances 
of its implementation, is the monetary benefits to consumers. Under 
the direction of Australia’s Future Tax System Review, the 
increased revenues of the carbon tax will increase the tax-free 
threshold to exclude one million people from having to file an 
income tax return in the 2013 tax year.133 
A Canadian working study indicates that British Columbia’s 
carbon tax was more effective in reducing demand for carbon 
producing fuels than the impact associated with gasoline price 
increases caused by the tax.134 Carbon taxes are effective because 
they are easy to implement, compared to setting up trading systems 
or more comprehensive policies.135 However, carbon tax policies 
would be difficult to enforce in international transactions. In a recent 
example, the U.S. Senate blocked European Union efforts to enforce 
their emissions trading program standards on U.S. airlines.136 
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IV. THE LOUISIANA APPROACH: THE WIND AND SOLAR ENERGY 
SYSTEMS TAX CREDIT 
A. Background 
This section focuses on the impact of Louisiana’s largest 
renewable energy tax credit: the Wind and Solar Energy Systems 
Tax Credit (WSES).137 The WSES tax credit is a corporate or 
individual income tax credit.138 The credit is provided to three 
different categories of taxpayers who install wind or solar energy 
systems: (1) a taxpayer who owns his residence, (2) a taxpayer who 
owns a residential rental apartment project, or (3) any taxpayer, 
regardless of property rights, who buys and installs a wind or solar 
energy system at a Louisiana residence or residential rental 
apartment project.139 The credit amount is 50% of the cost of each 
wind or solar energy system, including installation costs.140 The 
maximum amount of the credit per system is $12,500, which is 
refundable and can be used in combination with federal tax 
credits.141 When the WSES was enacted in 2007, the estimated 
annual lost tax revenue was $500,000 per year.142 However, 
estimates place the corporate and individual tax revenue lost over a 
five-year period at $49 million,143 nearly twenty times higher than 
expected. 
B. The Result of Vague Drafting 
The WSES tax credit is too vague to accomplish its goal and 
remain fiscally responsible. Prior to 2009, only a “resident 
individual at his residence” or “the owner of a residential rental 
apartment project” could claim the tax credit for a solar or wind 
energy system.144 The legislators added another possible category of 
claimants defined as “a taxpayer who purchases and installs such a 
system in a residence or a residential rental apartment project which 
is located in Louisiana.”145 This newly added claimant category 
departs from the original language that involved real property 
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ownership; the purchaser (who is the installer) of the renewable 
energy system does not need to have a property interest in the 
residence. This language was added because some homeowners 
wanted to install solar energy systems, but they could not afford the 
initial investment—which was not subsidized by the state and 
federal credits.  
Rather than requiring the consumer to obtain a loan from a 
financial institution to pay the unsubsidized portion, this change 
created a leasing structure that has led to substantial increases in the 
credit usage. This leasing structure proved to be lucrative for both 
residential consumers and solar panel installers alike. After the tax 
credit was extended to installers of solar panels, the credit amount 
jumped from $1.4 million in the 2009 fiscal year to $7 million in the 
2010 fiscal year.146 The initial installation and equipment costs are 
completely financed by a leasing company.147 Then, solar panel 
companies receive the Louisiana per system 50% credit and the 
federal 30% grant,148 and the customer repays the remaining 20% in 
installments to the leasing company.149 The leasing companies are 
typically set up as separate entities of the solar panel installers but 
are owned by the same individuals.150 
Although the leasing company and the solar panel installers are 
related entities, there are no regulations to govern the relationship.151 
This lack of regulation creates problems when the installation entity 
“sells” the equipment to the leasing company at an increased cost, 
who then leases it out to the customers.152 The statute allows a tax 
credit “per system” although “system” is not defined in the 
statute.153 The related entities can take advantage of this by marking 
up their product when it is sold to the leasing agent, and claim an 
arbitrary number of systems in order to cover their installation and 
production costs. For example, a panel that has a production cost of 
$20,000 can be marked up to $50,000 when sold to the leasing 
entity. The leasing entity can then file for two systems under the 
wind and solar energy tax credits. The credit provides a 50% credit 
of costs up to $25,000 per system, so the leasing entity is recovering 
$25,000 when its initial costs were only $20,000. While this may 
seem like fraudulent behavior from the solar panel installer and the 
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leasing company, it is technically allowed under the current 
legislation because “system” is not defined. 
C. The Effectiveness of Wind and Solar Energies 
1. Wind 
The wind energy industry is in a difficult stage because it is 
competing directly with other developing types of energy 
harvesting. Hydraulic fracturing has lessened the appeal of wind 
energy: it has led to an abundant source of relatively cleaner energy 
than petroleum and is less expensive than wind energy. While $2.93 
MWh to $3.52 MWh has been the price of natural gas in past 
years,154 natural gas has traded at $1.09 MWh.155 In comparison, the 
unsubsidized cost of wind energy is $60 to $90 per MWh.156 If the 
federal subsidies are included in the calculation along with 
allowable tax depreciation, the cost of wind energy becomes $33 to 
$65 per MWh.157 The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
expects costs to decrease 10–30% between 2015 and 2020 from 
increased technology and economies of scale.158 
2. Solar 
The solar industry directly competes with retail utility 
companies that supply energy to residential users. When utility 
customers supplement or replace their utility energy usage with solar 
power, these utilities lose business. To properly examine the 
usefulness of solar energy, it must be compared to utility prices. 
Residential solar panels cost $213 to $345 per MWh hour, and 
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commercial panels can cost as little as $178 per MWh hour.159 
Meanwhile, the average electricity cost for Louisiana in May 2012 
was $85.70 per MWh hour for residential customers and $77.40 per 
MWh hour for commercial customers.160 
V. PROPOSALS AND SOLUTIONS 
A. Federal Scope 
As discussed above,161 the costs of solar and wind energy are not 
competitive with non-renewable alternatives. If the overarching goal 
of the federal incentives for renewable energy is to encourage clean 
energy production, the policies should be created with both 
sustainability and control of negative externalities as benchmarks. A 
plan that makes renewable energy sources more competitive while 
remaining fiscally responsible should include the abandonment of 
existing non-renewable incentives, increased federal standards for 
utilities, and a commitment to publicly funded research. 
Also discussed above, tax policy is useful for addressing the 
problem of externalities and encouraging certain activities.162 
Unfortunately, the efforts of lobbyists and inconsistencies in drafting 
tax legislation tend to distort the benefits of tax policy.163 For this 
reason, it is best to abandon tax incentives in the energy sector 
entirely and take a competitive market approach in conjunction with 
federal standards. Since it is highly unlikely that legislators would 
ever abandon tax policy in the energy market as a whole, legislators 
should instead focus on winding down incentives for non-renewable 
resources. Incentives for the petroleum industry further exacerbate 
the deadweight loss created from the social costs of burning fossil 
fuels. The market price of petroleum is not fully representative of 
the cost of the activity, and petroleum companies are also rewarded 
through tax incentives. Often, these incentives are pieced together in 
an inconsistent, quilt-like fashion. For example, Louisiana offers 
severance tax exemptions for drilling existing, deep wells and 
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rejuvenating old wells.164 At the same time, suspension of tax 
liability is allowed on newly drilled wells until the estimated payout 
is met.165 One can see that the purpose behind the exemptions is to 
discourage unnecessary drilling and avoid waste, but the suspension 
of tax liability works against the purpose by incentivizing new 
drilling. 
Along with the ideal goal of eliminating subsidies in the energy 
industry, the federal government should develop standards to 
increase the use of clean energy sources. The Clean Energy 
Standard Act of 2012 (CES) drafted by New Mexico Senator Jeff 
Bingaman proposed a market-based set of standards that govern the 
activities of major utilities.166 The CES would begin regulating the 
largest utilities in 2015 by requiring 24% of electric energy sold to 
consumers to come from clean sources.167 The requirement can be 
met by acquiring clean energy certificates through self-production or 
through the certificate trading market compliance payments of $0.03 
per kilowatt hour, or a combination of compliance payments and 
certificates.168 The CES is a combination of renewable portfolio 
standards and feed-in tariffs because the policy has components that 
control both the quantity and the price of clean energy.169 The major 
distinction between the CES and renewable energy portfolio 
standards is that the CES allows the quota to be supplied by “clean 
energy sources,” rather than only “renewable energy sources.” Clean 
energy is defined as renewable energy, qualified renewable biomass, 
natural gas, hydropower, nuclear power, or qualified waste-to-
energy.170 Therefore, utilities can choose the most competitively 
priced source of clean energy.171 
One major reason for providing incentives to renewable energy 
sources is that increasing the use of the energy technology will cause 
it to be more efficient and cost-effective over time through 
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economies of scale. For example, wind turbine costs have been 
found to decrease by 14% every time the total number in operation 
doubles.172 The technology involved in developing renewable 
sources would not advance at the same rate if incentives were 
abandoned. An effective way to encourage more efficient means of 
harvesting energy sources is to commit to publicly-funded research. 
The Advanced Research Projects Agency-Energy (ARPA-E) was 
started in 2007 to research and develop high-risk, high-reward 
technology to increase energy efficiency and lower U.S. dependence 
on imported energy.173 The SunShot Initiative shares the same 
purpose as the ARPA-E, but focuses on reducing the cost of solar 
energy production.174 The SunShot Initiative provides loans and 
grants to private companies, laboratories, and academic institutions 
that promise research into solar energy storage and production.175 It 
is important to have a combination of purely governmental research 
work and private research that is publicly funded. Purely 
governmental research should fund projects that private groups are 
not willing to pursue because of a low chance of a payoff. At the 
same time, private researchers could focus on refining and 
redesigning the way energy sources are utilized. These programs 
could receive funding from revenue generated by ending tax 
subsidies to the energy industries. 
B. State Level 
1. Proposed Amendments to the Wind and Solar Energy Systems 
Credit 
The Louisiana Department of Revenue has responded to the 
inflated costs of the tax credit and has proposed an amendment to 
WSES that limits the credit to one per residence or apartment 
instead of one credit per wind or solar energy system.176 The 
proposal also eliminates many of the system installation costs that 
                                                                                                             
 172. Press Release from Bloomberg New Energy Finance, Onshore Wind 
Energy to Reach Parity with Fossil-Fuel Electricity by 2016 (Nov. 10, 2011), 
available at http://bnef.com/PressReleases/view/172. 
 173. ARPA-E, Fiscal Year 2013 Congressional Justification (2013) at 401, 
http://arpa-e.energy.gov/sites/default/files/ARPA-E%20FY13%20Budget%20 
Request.pdf. 
 174. SunShot Initiative: About, DEP’T. OF ENERGY, https://www1.eere.energy 
.gov/solar/sunshot/about.html (last visited Oct. 4, 2013). 
 175. Id. 
 176. LA. ADMIN. CODE, tit. 61, pt. I., §1907 (2013). Previously, the credit 
could be applied to multiple systems used in one residence or apartment. 
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can currently be credited.177 The Department of Revenue estimates 
that if the amendment had been in place for the 2011 to 2012 fiscal 
year, the credits that qualified for the WSES would have been cut by 
40%.178 The estimated budget impact from the restrictions on the 
WSES is about $62.7 million in savings over the next three years.179 
However, the legislative intent behind the credit remains the same. 
A comment to the proposed amendment indicates that the effects of 
the amendment will be measured and monitored as a safeguard to 
decreases in solar energy usage.180 
2. Proposals 
Tailoring the language of the WSES tax credit to increase solar 
and wind energy production could reduce the large amount of tax 
revenue lost per year. First, the statute should define the term 
“system.” Under the current statute, “each residence or apartment 
project in the state is eligible for tax credits for the number of 
separate complete . . . systems necessary to ensure that the residence 
is supplied with all of its energy needs.”181 As previously discussed, 
the vague wording of “system” allows claimants to obtain an 
unlimited number of systems credits and therefore recover 50% of 
all solar installation costs.182 The proposed amendment states that 
“regardless of the number of system components installed on each 
qualifying residence or residential apartment complex, such 
components shall constitute a single system for each residence or 
dwelling unit in a residential rental apartment complex for purposes 
of the tax credit.”183 The change clearly reflects the Legislature’s 
intent to limit lost income from this loophole going forward, but the 
limitation seems to stray from the purpose of providing residences 
with affordable solar and wind energy. For example, an apartment 
complex would clearly need a larger solar panel capacity than a 
small single family home. Legislators should define “system” in 
terms of usage, such as square footage or occupancy rather than 
limiting the credit to one system per residence. This way the credit is 
                                                                                                             
 177. Id. (“Including certain capitalized expenditures, solar pool heating, certain 
housing surrounding non-rooftop systems, labor costs including but not limited to 
tree trimming or removal, cooling HVAC systems, certain attic fans or ventilation 
systems, solar powered lights, air-conditioning/heating units, day lighting 
apparatuses, pool pumps and all other stand-alone wind or solar devices.”).  
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Supra Part IV.A. 
 183. LA. ADMIN. CODE, tit. 61, pt. I., §1907. 
2013] COMMENT 141 
 
 
 
equitable with energy consumption levels and would indicate true 
costs of equipment. 
Second, the credit should be based on a measurement of 
production. Louisiana is one of two states that provides a 50% tax 
credit for wind and solar energy systems. Oregon, the other state that 
does so, allows a $2.10 credit per watt of the installed capacity.184 A 
per-watt credit would reward the installation of high capacity 
systems. Tying the credit to a wattage standard would also curb any 
possibility of leasing companies installing lower capacity, lower cost 
systems and applying for the tax credit after the price has been 
marked up between the related parties. A kilowatt hour maximum 
could serve as an alternative to the tax credit limit and reduce the 
installation of unnecessary equipment that exceeds the amount of 
possible energy usage. 
Third, the credit should not apply solely to residential buildings. 
If the purpose of the WSES credit is to increase the use of renewable 
energy sources and reduce non-renewable sources, it is counter-
intuitive to disallow the tax credit for commercial buildings. 
Commercial buildings are typically larger than residential structures 
and would have more square footage of available roof space to 
install large solar panel arrays. If the reason for only offering the 
subsidy to consumer buildings is to limit lost tax revenue, the 
previous recommendations would reduce the costs enough to keep 
lost revenue at the same level or less. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, wind and solar energies are not yet sustainable on 
their own merits when viewed next to alternatives. With recent 
developments in hydraulic fracturing, natural gas is abundant and is 
a cleaner alternative to traditional energy sources,185 though it is still 
non-renewable. It would be most beneficial to end tax subsidies on 
non-renewable energy sources and focus predominately on cleaner 
and less expensive non-renewable alternatives until renewable 
sources are capable of competing in a free market setting. This can 
be accomplished by mandating renewable energy use through 
increased federal standards and government-funded research at the 
private and public levels. 
                                                                                                             
 184. OR. DEP’T. OF ENERGY, RESIDENTIAL ENERGY TAX CREDIT (RETC) RULES 
16 (2011), http://www.oregon.gov/energy/CONS/RES/tax/docs/oar-retc.pdf. 
 185. Electricity from Natural Gas, ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, http://www 
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The recent Louisiana state budget crisis created in part by the 
WSES and CVAF subsidies indicates that the absence of specificity 
when drafting statutes leads to expensive and unforeseen results. 
When considering the WSES tax credit, the state must first decide 
whether cutting current costs are worth the decrease in renewable 
energy use, jobs, and disposable income from consumers. Second, 
the drafters must create enforcement mechanisms to dissuade abuses 
of the tax credit. A per-energy unit standard for the solar panels or a 
defined measurement of what a system is would be beneficial to 
consumers who want to legitimately maximize their solar panel 
usage, but they cannot due to the proposed one tax credit per system 
cap. Third, and most importantly, Louisiana should examine what 
their primary purpose behind enacting the WSES and then extend it 
in situations that fit the purpose such as commercial buildings. 
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